SAVE THE SCOTTISH REGIMENTS CAMPAIGN

From a letter to the Prime Minister
by
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) R H Paterson OBE BA MLitt FCMI 

Images from

feature on the Regiments

INTRODUCTION
We believe the proposal to announce cuts in the number of infantry battalions before the Christmas recess is placing pre-election financial manoeuvring before the needs of national security. We also believe the Ministry of Defence’s direction that the existing Scottish regiments should lose their individual identity and form one, or two, large regiments cannot be justified in terms of defence.  

UNDER RESOURCED 

Overstretch was a problem for infantry battalions before the invasion of Iraq, but events since that campaign began have exacerbated the situation.  There have been assertions from the outset, that operations in Iraq were under resourced. US Army General Wesley Clark expressed that view at the beginning of the campaign and has reiterated it more recently. Paul Bremner, the former US Administrator in Iraq, has expressed the same view. Closer to home Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK’s ambassador to the United Nations prior to the war in Iraq, and subsequently the UK’s Special Representative to Iraq from September 2003 to March 2004, had this to say when addressing the Royal United Services Institute in September 2004. 
"If in your military philosophy you do not go to war unless you have overwhelming force on your side before you begin, and that is the case with the United States in any conceivable situation, why on earth not over-insure in the situation after any conflict, when the problems may be more difficult in practice than during the conflict itself?" 
The consequence of having inadequate US and British troop levels in Iraq is clear. Establishing security is taking longer than it should, and minimising casualties is more difficult.  
In late August there were press reports that requests from British commanders in Iraq for reinforcements had been rejected on political grounds. In mid-September there were widespread press reports that General John McColl, the Deputy Commander of the multi-national force in Iraq, was critical of the cuts proposed by Mr Hoon. He was quoted in The Scotsman on 13 September as saying: “The army is very busy indeed and the reduction of the four battalions will not help in any way”. 
The army, and especially the infantry, is struggling to continue to sustain the level of operations to which it has been committed by the Government. 

OVERSTRETCHED 

On 21 July the Secretary of State for Defence announced his intention to cut the infantry by 10 per cent, from 40 battalions to 36 battalions, by 1 April 2008.
Two major ‘reasons’ were given to justify that decision. The cessation of Arms Plot[1] moves for infantry battalions and the future reduction of troop levels in Northern Ireland.  Significantly, however, nothing was said about making any effort to achieve the long-standing, but equally long ignored, Defence Planning Assumption that units should enjoy 24 months between operational tours. We understand, and accept, the reasons for the cessation of the Arms Plot. We also acknowledge that ending the Arms Plot will increase the availability of the number of battalions, but arms plotting is due to be phased out over the next ten years and 1 April 2008 is somewhat nearer than that.  Being able to reduce troop levels in Northern Ireland is but another assumption.
Against that background it is illogical for the Secretary of State for Defence to be set to make an announcement before Christmas on which infantry battalions will be cut.  Announcing cuts now, well before there can be any reduction of overstretch as a consequence of the cessation of the Arms Plot, or the reduction of troop levels in Northern Ireland or Iraq, can only exacerbate an already difficult situation.  The timing of the cuts could, of course, have far more to do with diverting expenditure to more vote-winning programmes prior to the next election than anything to do with national security, but more of that later.
On hearing the Secretary of State’s announcement in the House on 21 July Bruce George, Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, and a member of your Party, asked Mr Hoon: “Who was the idiot who thought we could cut the infantry at a time when the pressure on it was enormous?
Professor Paul Wilkinson[2] writing in Scotland on Sunday on 25 July opened his article with this sentence: “The publication of the [United States] 9/11 report and the announcement of swingeing defence cuts in the UK provide a timely opportunity to review the progress of the war on terrorism”. He then ended his review with this sentence: “In the light of the global terrorist threat we now face, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon’s decision to reduce the strength of our already overstretched Army defies belief.”
Before Mr Hoon’s announcement the Home Secretary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police appeared on national television to warn the population that, as far as a terrorist attack in the UK was concerned, it was not a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’.  Furthermore, just five days after Mr Hoon’s announcement that he was intent on reducing the armed forces, the Home Office issued a 22-page leaflet on ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ to every household in the country. At best that seems strange timing; it certainly does not look like joined up government. It could be, of course, that Mr Hoon had just made a bad decision.  
An article by Major General Stone, a former Engineer officer, in the August edition of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI) monthly Newsbrief is highly critical of the proposed cuts. His concluding sentence states that: “To cut anything, but particularly infantry battalions, at this time would unacceptably jeopardize the UK’s readiness”.    
In similar vein Dr Jeremy Stocker, a former Royal Navy officer and currently a senior Principal of the Centre for Defence and International Security, writing in the July/August edition of The Officer magazine describes the proposed cuts in the infantry as the “most disastrous” aspect of Mr Hoon’s statement. Dr Stocker concludes his article by stating that:  
“At a time when some 40% of our infantry manpower is being deployed on a further operational tour only one year after returning from the previous one, one can only wonder what led the Defence Minister to a decision which seems to fly in the face of both logic and the facts.”
Air Marshal The Lord Garden and General Sir David Ramsbotham, writing in the RUSI Journal in August 2004 remain critical of Mr Hoon’s proposals, especially their timing, despite reassurances given by the Ministry of Defence’s Policy Director, Simon Webb.
“Even if this policy [of making cuts in the armed services] were rational, the taking of the personnel and platform cuts ahead of the arrival of the new systems leaves us in the worst of all worlds. We will have neither the wherewithal for serious warfighting, nor the people for war prevention. The latest Defence Committee report on the failures of Smart Acquisition confirm our unease about the viability of the future equipment programme.
Despite the smooth reassurances of Simon Webb, we believe that the 2004 Defence Review marks a watershed. We may come back to look on this year as the moment we took the wrong fork in the road.” 
Anyone reading the informed press since 21 July can only conclude that the Secretary of State’s intention to reduce the number of infantry battalions is seriously flawed.   

THE IMPACT OF OVERSTRETCH ON THE SCOTTISH REGIMENTS 
This is what overstretch currently means for Scottish infantry battalions: 

·        The Royal Scots arrived in Edinburgh in March/April 2002 after a two-year tour of operational duty in Northern Ireland.  Six months later they deployed to Bosnia for a six-month tour of duty.  After a gap of just seven months the great majority of the battalion deployed to Iraq, at short notice, for another six-month operational tour to reinforce the troops already in theatre.  The battalion has been placed on high readiness alert to return to Iraq with effect from 3 January, just eight months after returning from that country.  With elections due to be held in Iraq in January it seems highly likely that they will be returning to that country early in 2005. 

·        In the autumn of 2003 The Royal Highland Fusiliers moved to Cyprus.  Since arriving on the island they have provided the Falkland Islands reinforcement infantry company and completed an operational tour of duty in Iraq.  

·        The Kings Own Scottish Borderers ended a six-month tour of operational duty in Northern Ireland in the spring of 2002.  Fourteen months later they deployed for a six-month tour of duty in Iraq. Just one month after returning from Iraq they moved to Northern Ireland for a two-year tour of duty. 
 

·        The Black Watch served on a six-month operational tour of duty in Kosovo in the latter part of 2001.  Fifteen months later they deployed to Iraq for four months of war fighting.  Just twelve months later they returned to Iraq, despite the fact that they were based at the Land Warfare Centre at Warminster where their role was to support the training of others.  Inevitably their deployment adds to overstretch for those battalions who have to fill in for them while overseas.  Inevitably it also has an adverse effect on the training of others. 

·        The Highlanders had a company deployed on a six-month operational tour of duty in Kosovo that ended in the spring of 2002.  Eleven months later the battalion deployed to Bosnia for a six-month tour of duty. They have subsequently converted to the armoured infantry role and it is widely expected that they will be deployed to Iraq in 2005. 

·        The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders completed a two-year tour of operational duty in Northern Ireland in the autumn of 2003 and just four months later they deployed to Iraq for six months.  It has recently been reported in the press that, although it is just four months since they returned from Iraq, they have recently been placed on ten days notice to return to that country. 

Overstretch is also impacting on the Territorial Army. During 2003-04 331 Territorial Army soldiers were mobilised from Scotland’s two Territorial battalions to fill operational appointments in Iraq.  That number represents about one third of the strength of those battalions.  Furthermore only about a third of the number deployed were used to reinforce Scottish battalions, the others going to serve with English or Welsh regiments, or being used for duties such as force protection.  The members of the Territorial Army provide invaluable and essential additional manpower to the army, but while individuals may well be willing to return for additional tours of duty (many already have) the good will of their employers is being stretched to the limit.  Members of the Territorial Army used to include that fact on their CV’s as they felt it enhanced their job prospects.  Sadly, for many, that is no longer the case.  An employee that has a mobilisation liability is also seen as a commercial liability. 
It seems inconceivable that anyone aware of the above commitments could envisage reducing the current six Scottish infantry battalions to five.

OVERSPENT AND UNDERFUNDED 
When Chief of the General Staff General Sir Mike Jackson KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) wrote to all commanding officers on 21 July to elaborate on the Secretary of State’s statement to the House he emphasised that the future army structure was not driven by finance.  We are aware that the future army structure has been under discussion for some time and we are quite prepared to accept that when that study started it was not finance driven.  Things, however, have changed.  
The CGS, in the same letter, acknowledges that: “the spending review exercise this year has been very challenging for Defence and the Army”.  This means “the Treasury  wants us to make cuts”.  Later in the same letter the the CGS acknowledges that the six-month ban imposed on recruiting with effect from 1 July was “frustrating, but we have no choice other than to keep the Army at the funded level”. What a way to run an army that is committed to your war in Iraq while simultaneously short of some 5,000 personnel. The subordination of the CGS to some nameless budget manger is confirmed when he writes: “We are looking at ways to alleviate these constraints”. Perhaps he was looking, but the ban remained in place for the full six months.  Keeping the numbers down, while blaming the regiments for poor recruiting would, of course, make it easier to impose cuts.
It seems anomalous that the CGS has to keep the army at the funded level when such constraints clearly do not apply to other areas of Mr Hoon’s budget.  
Just a week after Mr Hoon announced his proposed cuts the Commons Defence Select Committee issued a report that accused his Ministry of wasting billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money through the botched introduction of new procedures for buying equipment.[3] A part of that report was based on a National Audit Office forecast that overspends on the top twenty procurement projects would amount to £3.1 billion, with an average delivery delay of eighteen months.  
The opening statement in the editorial in The Scotsman on 28 July summarised the situation succinctly. “The blunders in British defence policy which have culminated in wholesale cuts in troop numbers, regiments, frigates, tanks and attack aircraft have a common root: the inability of the MoD to control its budget”.  
This extract from the editorial of Scotland on Sunday on 25 July commenting on Mr Hoon’s announcement places the blame for his financial embarrassment firmly on the Treasury. 
“In Scotland the threat from their political masters to the traditions of the most illustrious fighting units in world military history has been greeted with dismay by ex-servicemen and the regions from which they recruit. In this case the political master is Gordon Brown, for let no one be under any illusion that these changes are anything other than driven by the desire of a very Labour Treasury to take funds from defence to finance civilian expenditure. Despite the fact that the future of Northern Ireland is still very much in the balance, and troop levels in the province have had to remain high, the Treasury wants pay-back for the ongoing IRA ceasefire, and it wants it now. With thousands of servicemen pinned down in Iraq, the timing could not have been worse.” 
It would, indeed, be ironical if Mr Brown, who is reputed to have gained one of the best first class history honours degrees ever awarded by The University of Edinburgh, is to be responsible, directly or indirectly, for the annihilation of all six of Scotland’s remaining historic regiments. What a legacy. 
However, the apparently uncontrollable procurement budget is not the only problem, as this quotation from the August edition of the RUSI Journal makes clear.  
“…the MoD had been fighting a long battle to make the books balance and had been fighting a blood-stained retreat for the past year, requiring substantial short-term cuts to be made in uncommitted expenditure. This is in part due to a difference in interpretation of Resource Accounting and Budgeting between the MoD and the Treasury; both sides thought they were right, and the MoD lost. So much for joined up government.” 
The truth finally came out in the press on 1 November when it was reported that, despite Mr Hoon’s earlier reassurances to the contrary, his Ministry was seeking to make £6 billion of savings over the next three years to meet financial targets imposed by the Treasury. So much for open government.  
It is now clear that the reason why Mr Hoon is announcing cuts has everything to do with money. Whether that is because he is unable to manage his budget competently or whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made inadequate provision for defence is a matter for the Prime Minister to resolve. It must, however, be resolved now and without recourse to cutting infantry battalions, all of which are essential if the country is to continue to meet the commitments into which you have entered. Putting procurement before people is the wrong priority. 

UNDER MANNED AND UNDER VALUED 
The British army has been undermanned by some 5,000 posts for some time. Mr Hoon’s answer to that problem is to reduce the establishment by 6,500 posts. That is not the right answer. We need to fill those additional posts to meet our existing commitments and consequently we need to find ways of filling them. 
On 27 July The Scotsman quoted CGS as saying: “If these [the Scottish] regiments are so precious why are not more Scotsmen joining up”. That remark caused considerable offence. Perhaps CGS is not aware that Scotland has always provided more soldiers for the British Army per head of population than the rest of the United Kingdom. That situation remains true to today: some 13.5% of the army is recruited in Scotland. Many of those soldiers, however, choose to join units such as engineers, signals or, indeed, the Parachute Regiment in preference to their local infantry regiment. 
Why do we not provide better pay and conditions for our soldiers?
When the government wants more policemen, nurses or teachers etc it finds the money to recruit them and ensures that they are paid sufficiently well to remain in their posts. So why do we not adopt the same policy for soldiers? A private soldier is currently paid £12,000 pa and, especially if he is an infantryman, is worked off his feet, rarely at home, and frequently in danger of being killed. Furthermore, he may be called on at short notice to replace striking firemen, who work far fewer hours and get far better paid, or any other public sector worker whenever they choose to do what a soldier can’t, withdraw their labour. Pay is an issue. The publicly owned Edinburgh bus fleet carries advertisements saying drive a bus with us and earn £20,000 pa. The comparison is compelling. Poor accommodation is another issue. CGS himself acknowledged that in his letter of 21 July when he stated: “I should highlight in particular the unacceptably poor accommodation  in which too many live and work”.
Our servicemen and women are undervalued and it is time we instituted a major review of their terms and conditions of service to ensure that they are rewarded appropriately for their service to their country.      

 
THE JACKSON DIKTAT 

CGS’s letter of 21 July to the army directed that the nineteen single battalion regiments would form large regiments of two or more battalions. The only explanation given for that change was that it would: “...facilitate individual postings in the post arms plot era”. Retaining the status quo was not an option and formed no part of the so-called consultation process. The Council of Scottish Colonels were instructed to recommend, in addition to how to reduce from six to five battalions, whether they wished to reorganise into two large regiments, of two or three battalions, or one large regiment of five battalions. Rightly, in my opinion, faced with that stark choice, they settled for the latter option. Having, in effect, been asked to play Russian roulette they have also recommended, although not unanimously, to merge The Royal Scots with The Kings Own Scottish Borderers.  
The above, however, begs the glaring question of why it is necessary for Scotland’s existing historic regiments to lose their individual identity and form a single large regiment. Simply to ‘facilitate’ change is a woefully inadequate reason. Why should we turn our much-loved, and internationally envied, structure in side out now just to make things easier for those at the top? Can’t they cope? The army has operated a two-tier system of large and single battalion regiments for the past forty years: why change it now? When the army today is relying on Scottish single battalion regiments to make such a disproportionate contribution to operations in Iraq how on earth can it argue that the large regiment is necessary?  
CGS writing in The Spectator on 11 September makes no case to support the large regiment argument other than to say that moving individuals between battalions with different roles: “. . . can only be sensibly done within a large regiment if cap-badge identity is to be maintained”. That really is a non sequitur. What on earth in that context does ‘sensibly’ mean? And is CGS really arguing that hundreds of years of unique identity can be subsumed into a common cap-badge? Frankly the notion is risible. Mr Hoon’s article in The Scotsman on 28 October is, quite simply duplicitous. It makes absolutely no case for the large regiment and is just a mind-numbing series of platitudes and half-truths. If Messrs Hoon and Jackson are going to have articles in the press issued in their names they need to employ rather more competent writers.  

We challenge the Secretary of State to prove that the proposal to merge the existing Scottish regiments into a single large regiment is necessary for the defence of the nation. If he cannot prove that to the satisfaction of the Scottish people, and we don’t think he can, his proposal is ultra vires. Mr Hoon is interfering in Scottish history and culture and that, most certainly, is not part of his remit. 
Having made that point we wish to acknowledge that we entirely accept that when Arms Plot moves cease there will be a need to move soldiers more frequently between battalions for career or personal reasons. The Scottish regiments will embrace that change with the same professional vigour as they, and all our servicemen and women, always have in the past. But turning the system inside out just places a wholly unnecessary obstacle in the way of that change. All change is inherently destabilising. Good change management acknowledges that fact and does all it can to explain the reasons for change. No reasons have been given for the issue of this direction and, quite rightly, it is widely resented both within the Scottish regiments and, increasingly, throughout Scotland.      
We are utterly unconvinced that the cessation of Arms Plot moves makes it necessary to merge the existing Scottish single battalion regiments into a large regiment. In contrast to the Ministry of Defence we are prepared to give reasons to support our position.  

·        First, the end of Arms Plot moves is ten years away. Why, therefore, is it necessary to adopt a large regiment structure now?  

·        Second, all soldiers joining Scottish regiments have been recruited into a Scottish Division since 1 May 1968. Consequently there has been no legal or administrative impediment to moving soldiers between battalions for the past thirty-six years. 

·        Third, NCOs have long been promoted on the basis of a Scottish Division, rather than a single battalion, seniority role and, where necessary, they have moved from regiment to regiment for career purposes.  

·        Fourth, officers are commissioned into Her Majesty’s Land Forces and have always moved, as required, in the interests of their service.  Furthermore the promotion of officers has always been controlled on an army wide basis. We acknowledge that in the past there have been occasions when the appointment of commanding officers of battalions has been unduly influenced by Colonels of Regiments but when that has happened it has been a failure of senior management and, most certainly, is not attributable to structural organisation.  

·        Fifth, when Arms Plot moves end the unwillingness of soldiers to move from place to place, or from role to role, will have far more to do with domestic stability, ie childrens’ education, partners’ work and buying and selling property, than from changing, for example, from being an Argyll to a Royal Scot.    

·        Sixth, all the Scottish regiments, rightly, get some extra inner strength from an understanding of their own traditions. Such intangible factors are difficult to quantify but here is one current example. Sir Menzies Campbell, when paying tribute on television to the three Black Watch soldiers killed recently inn Iraq, made the point that the Regiment would be helped to come to terms with the death of its comrades by its professionalism and traditions. He was absolutely right. Is now the time to erode those traditions? We think not.  

In view of the above we can see absolutely no military reason why the existing Scottish regiments should be divested of their individual royal Colonels-in-Chiefs, Colonels, colours, traditions and geographical roots to from a single large regiment. The threat of that change is currently hanging over those regiments. That threat damages morale and, as all previous examples clearly demonstrate, it has an adverse effect on recruiting and retention.[4] Surely that is just the opposite of what we want. Or is it?  
It could be, of course, that there is a more sinister political reason. A single large regiment divested of all the individual regimental traditions listed above, and structured as a Whitehall clone would be far less capable of resisting unnecessary and unwarranted interference. Above all, at some stage in the future, it would be much easier to cut the 5^th Battalion of a large regiment than yet another single battalion regiment. It would be even more galling if that cut, like those currently proposed, had more to do with an overspent Defence budget and an unashamedly redistributive Chancellor than the defence of the nation.    

CALL FOR ACTION 
Our armed forces have never been more overstretched. Nevertheless, Mr Hoon intends to announce, before the Christmas recess, which battalions will be cut and to confirm his wish to create large regiments out of all the remaining single battalion regiments. We suggest that such an announcement would be militarily incompetent and, at least in Scotland, politically crass. That would be doubly the case if, as is widely expected, Mr Hoon intends to place a multi £billion order for additional Eurofighters in the same timeframe.  
To interfere with the number and structure of the Scottish regiments at a time when they are committed disproportionately to the Government's war in Iraq will be perceived as a betrayal. Mr Hoon needs to come to the Dispatch Box now and announce that there will be no cuts in infantry battalions, and that the Scottish regiments will be allowed to continue to give distinguished service to the country without being forced to accept any diminution of their unique regimental identities.